Compassion : Human and Animal

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I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain’d,
I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.

So they show their relations to me and I accept them,
They bring me tokens of myself, they evince them plainly in their possession.

Walt Whitman, *Song of Myself*

Frau von Briest had meanwhile sent in the coffee and was looking toward the round tower and the flower-bed. “Look, Briest. Rollo is lying in front of the gravestone again. He is more deeply affected than we are. He isn’t even eating any more.”

“Yes, Luise, animals. That’s what I’m always telling you. We aren’t as wonderful as we think. We always talk about their “instinct.” In the end that is, after all, the best.”…

[Frau von Briest now raises the question whether they, as Effi’s parents, are to blame for the disaster: was she simply too young to be married?]

Rollo, who awoke at these words, wagged his head slowly back and forth, and Briest said softly, “Let it go, Luise, let it go…that is too wide a field.”

Theodor Fontane, *Effi Briest*

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I

Human compassion is diseased. I do not speak primarily of its all-too-familiar failures of extent, the way we work up tremendous sympathy for thirteen people dead in Minnesota but have no emotional response to hundreds of thousands of people dead in Darfur. Those failures are common ground between humans and other animals,¹ and we may plausibly see a tendency to focus on the near-at-hand as part of our animal heritage, tenacious and difficult to overcome. No, I am speaking about failures of compassion that we would not expect to find in any other animal, cases of the most close-up and horrible human suffering that evoke, from its witnesses (and, often, perpetrators) no compassionate response. History, it often seems, is full of little else. Let me, however, confine myself to three closely related examples, cases in which it is plain not only that the emotional and moral failure in question is peculiarly human – an ape or elephant on the scene would do far better, or at least less badly – but also that the failure is at least partly explained by what primatologist Frans de Waal has called “anthropodenial,” the implicit denial (on the part of humans) that we are really animals.² It is no accident that all three of my cases concern misogyny, so often a prominent aspect of anthropodenial.³

To put my thesis in a nutshell: anthropodenial, a uniquely human tendency, is not simply a pernicious intellectual position: it is a large cause of moral deformity.

My first case is the ending of Theodor Fontane’s novel Effi Briest.⁴ Effi is married by her parents, at the age of sixteen, to a much older man who neglects her. Loneliness and immaturity lead her to have a brief affair, which she then breaks off, deciding that she did the wrong thing. She lives happily with her husband and child, until her husband, by sheer chance, discovers the long-ago indiscretion. At this point, husband, child, and parents all repudiate Effi, and she dies, miserable and alone. Only her dog Rollo feels compassion for her at the end of her life, attending to her supportively and seeming to understand her unhappiness; only he manifests deep sorrow after her death. The parents find themselves emotionally frozen: the shame at being known as the parents of a fallen woman quite overwhems their parental feeling. Looking at Rollo’s unalloyed sadness, Effi’s father concludes that in some ways animals behave better than humans.

My second case is Tolstoy’s famous novella, The Kreutzer Sonata.⁵ Describing the events that led him to murder his wife, the leading character describes a long-lasting pattern: the pressure of sexual desire compels him to have intercourse
with her, and afterwards he feels revulsion. He sees her as bestial and himself as dragged unwillingly into the bestial by his bondage to desire. Only when he has finally killed her does she become, for him, an object of compassion: he tells his interlocutor, with evident sympathy for women’s social situation, that women will never be treated as full human beings as long as sexual intercourse continues to exist. They will always be “humiliated and depraved slave[s].” The abuse he repeatedly inflicted on his wife by his repeated acts of sexual violence and non-consensual intercourse caused her great pain, which he sympathetically describes. During her life, however, her pain never aroused compassion, because compassionate response was swamped by disgust at the bodily act to which her presence summoned him. Only when, being dead, she no longer arouses desire can she become an object of compassion. No non-human animal is mentioned, but it goes without saying that the twisted emotions of this man are all-too-human. Had the poor wife had a Rollo, he would have shown sadness at her suffering.

My third case is, sadly, reality rather than fiction. It concerns the massacre of 2000 Muslims civilians by Hindu mobs in the state of Gujarat, India, in February 2002. During the pogrom, many women were tortured, raped, and burned: by one estimate, about half of the dead were women. A common device was to rape the woman, then torture her to death by inserting a large metal rod into her, and then torch her body. The horrible suffering of these women, which was later the occasion for a tremendous outpouring of compassion and helping behavior in the nation as a whole (as scholars and activists went to Gujarat to take down the testimony of survivors, help them file police reports, and write a record of the horrors for posterity), occasioned jubilation on the part of the Hindu right-wing rioters, who produced pornographic hate literature celebrating their conquests. In one pamphlet circulated during the riots, written in verse, the governor of the state of Gujarat, Narendra Modi (who masterminded the pogrom) is imagined as raping to death a woman who is simply called “the mother of Muslims”; this iconic woman is imagined as dead because she is penetrated by an uncircumcised penis which becomes, somehow, a fatal weapon (remember those metal rods that were actually used to torture and kill women), and yet, in the fantasy, she enjoys it to the last. The “poem” ends with a picture of the land of India completely cleansed of Muslims. Presumably there can be no more of them, once the “mother of Muslims” is dead.

I don’t even need to mention the fact that this orchestration of horror corresponds to nothing in the animal world.
Most discussions of the relationship between humans and animals, where empathy and compassion are concerned, focus on two things: continuities between human and animal emotion, and good discontinuities, meaning discontinuities in which we humans have something morally valuable that animals don’t have. Thus, Frans de Waal has consistently emphasized the way in which human sympathy, while in some ways more comprehensive than animal sympathy, is yet continuous with animal sympathy. He uses the image of a Russian doll: the outside doll is bigger, but inside we will find a little doll (the animal origins of the human emotion) that is in most respects isomorphic to the outer. Most of the commentators on de Waal’s recent Tanner Lectures grant that these continuities obtain and are important, but they focus on good discontinuities, stressing the fact that humans possess a range of desirable traits that non-human animals don’t appear to possess. These include: the ability to choose not to act on some powerful desires; the ability to think about one’s goals as a system and to rank and order them; the ability to think about the good of people (and animals) at a great distance from ourselves, the ability to test the principles of our conduct for impartiality and respectfulness to the claims of others.

In this way, many if not most of the people who write on this topic evoke the image of a scala naturae, in which we humans are at the top, the largest Russian doll in the set of dolls, the only one who is capable of full moral agency. Few mention the other side, the corruptions of sympathy that are so ubiquitous in human experience. Christine Korsgaard does prominently, if very briefly, acknowledge these, writing, in response to de Waal, “that human beings seem psychologically damaged in ways that suggest some deep break with nature.” On the whole, though, the recent discussion of the human-animal relationship, where compassion is concerned, neglects this “break,” which it is my plan to investigate here. I begin by mapping out an analysis of compassion that I have proposed for standard human cases. I then use this to investigate differences between human and animal compassion. This investigation will give us a set of reference points as we pursue our investigation of the “break.” The end result, I hope, will be a picture slightly different from de Waal’s, though agreeing with many of his most important claims: a picture in which the Russian doll on the outside is malicious, contorted, in ways that do not correspond to any deformation of the inside dolls.

In short, Walt Whitman’s account of the animal kingdom (in my epigraph) is no doubt too rosy and a bit sentimental, but in its most essential aspects it is correct. Animals do bring us “tokens of [ourselves],” and we should “accept them.” As Whitman knows and emphasizes, however, acceptance of our animality
involve an uphill battle against denial of animality and stigmatization of those whom a dominant group of humans views as quasi-animal (including prominently, in Whitman’s universe, both women and African-Americans). Animals don’t have to fight that battle. They don’t need a poem like Whitman’s “I Sing the Body Electric” — because they are that poem.

Jonathan Glover’s Humanity is a major achievement. Like no other book known to me in philosophy, it takes on the challenge of describing the moral horrors of the twentieth century and dissecting them perspicuously, so that we can understand a little better what human failings produced them, and how a program of moral education and culture-creation might begin to combat these failings. Richly detailed, informed by deep knowledge of history and psychology, the book goes further than any other I know, in any field, in presenting a rich and variegated understanding of inhumanity and its sources – in part because, being a philosophical book, it is so clear and compellingly argued, in part because, being a book by a reasonable and open-minded man, it refuses to plump for one of the monocausal explanations of atrocity so common in the literature about the Holocaust, where we find endless and sometimes fruitless debate about whether the Final Solution was caused by family structure, or culture, or ideology, or universal human tendencies to submit to authority and peer pressure. “All of the above,” is the obviously reasonable answer, but those who seek fame often eschew complexity in order to create a distinctive identity for themselves in the marketplace of ideas. Glover lacks such vices, and thus his book is delightfully complicated and non-reductive.

Despite its rich texture, however, there are two important silences, and the purpose of this paper is to continue and extend Glover’s project by speaking about what he has chosen not to speak about. Much though Glover discusses human compassion, he fails to include any discussion of the relationship between the human emotion and closely related emotions in the lives of non-human animals. Since I believe that I myself said too little about this question in Upheavals of Thought, this is an occasion to remedy that defect. Glover’s second and related silence concerns the human denial of kinship with the animal, and the misogyny that is all too often a concomitant of that denial, since women have repeatedly been portrayed as somehow more bodily than men, more viscous, less hard, with their indissoluble links to birth and sexual receptivity. At one point, Glover does broach this topic, when he discusses Klaus Theweleit’s Male Fantasies, with its analysis of the wish of the German males in question to become men of steel, hard and superhuman. Here Glover appears to endorse
Theweleit’s view that hatred of mere humanity is an important motive in bad behavior, saying, “Those who think of themselves as men of steel have to subdue anything which threatens to return them to the old type of person with soft flesh and disorganized human feelings.” He does not carry this analysis further, however – perhaps because he is skeptical of Theweleit’s psychoanalytical orientation.

The two silences are mutually reinforcing: not asking how human emotional experience differs from that of animals, Glover fails to focus on the fear and hatred of mere animal existence that is so conspicuously absent in non-human animals and so ubiquitous in human animals. The failure to pursue this lead, in turn, means a failure to explore the topic of misogyny, such a prominent feature of males’ hatred of their animal embodiment. And yet, it seems to me that the evidence for such emotional realities is as clear and compelling as the evidence for most of the other psychological responses that Glover does eloquently discuss. The emotions that I shall discuss have been studied by experimental psychology and by clinically and empirically oriented psychoanalysis, often in productive conversation with one another. Once one grants that emotions such as anger, disgust, and shame have an ideational content, one cannot avoid asking what that content is, and how it relates to the peculiar situation of the human being, as a highly intelligent being in a weak and mortal body. Experimental psychologists have not evaded these questions, and the hypotheses I shall advance are as testable as anything in a psychology that eschews narrow behaviorism and insists on interpreting the intentional content of living creatures’ responses – which is to say, I believe, the only sort of psychology that could possibly illuminate human emotional life.

I offer this analysis in the spirit of extension, not replacement, since, like Glover, I mistrust all reductive monocausal accounts of human depravity. I do so with the greatest admiration for Glover’s philosophical courage and insight, here and elsewhere, and also with deep gratitude to a philosophical friend.

II

In *Upheavals of Thought* I argue for an analysis of the human emotion standardly called “compassion” that derives from a long Western philosophical tradition of analysis and debate. According to my account (to some extent agreeing with this tradition, to some extent criticizing it), compassion has three thoughts as necessary parts. (I call them “judgments,” but I emphasize elsewhere that we need not think of these thoughts as linguistically formulated or formulable, although they do involve some type of predication or combination. Most animals
can see items in their environment as good or bad, and this is all we are ascribing, in ascribing emotions to animals, defined as I define them.) First, there is a judgment of seriousness: in experiencing compassion, the person who feels the emotion thinks that someone else is suffering in some way that is important and non-trivial. I argue that this assessment is typically made, and ought to be made, from the point of view of an external “spectator” or evaluator, the person who experiences the emotion. If we think that the suffering person is moaning and groaning over something that is not really bad, we won’t have compassion for that person. (For example, we don’t feel compassion for rich people who suffer when they pay their taxes, if we think that it is just right that they should pay their taxes.) If we think, on the other hand, that a person is unaware of a predicament that is really bad (e.g. an accident that removes higher mental functioning), then we will have compassion for the person even if the person doesn’t think his or her situation bad.

Second is the judgment of non-fault: we typically don’t feel compassion if we think the person’s predicament chosen or self-inflicted. This judgment, as we shall later see, is not a conceptual condition for all forms of compassion, since there are forms present in both the human and the animal cases that do not involve any assessment of responsibility. It is, however, a conceptual element in the most common forms of adult human compassion. In feeling compassion, we express the view that at least a good portion of the predicament was caused in a way for which the person is not to blame. Thus, Aristotle held that compassion for the hero of a tragedy views that hero as anaitios, not responsible for his downfall.19 When we think that a person brought a bad situation on himself, this thought would appear to inhibit formation of the emotion. Thus, as Candace Clark has emphasized in her excellent sociological study of American compassion,20 many Americans feel no compassion for the poor, because they believe that they bring poverty upon themselves through laziness and lack of effort.21 Even when we do feel compassion for people whom we also blame, the compassion and the blame typically address different phases or aspects of the person’s situation: thus we may blame a criminal for a criminal act while feeling compassion for him, if we think that the fact that he got to be the sort of person who commits criminal acts is in large part an outgrowth of social forces.

Blame comes in many types, corresponding to different categories of fault: deliberate malice, culpable negligence, and so forth. These will remove compassion to differing degrees. People’s responsibility for their predicaments can also be more or less serious, as a causal element in the overall genesis of the
event. In many such cases, compassion may still be present, but in a weakened form. To the extent that compassion remains, it would appear that it is directed, at least in part, at the elements of the disaster for which the person was not fully responsible.

The tradition then includes a third allegedly necessary element of compassion, namely, the judgment of similar possibilities. The person who has compassion often does think that the suffering person is similar to him or herself and has possibilities in life that are similar. This thought may do important work, removing barriers to compassion that have been created by artificial social divisions, as Rousseau valuably emphasizes in Book IV of *Emile*. For most humans, the thought of similar vulnerability probably is, as Rousseau argues, an important avenue to compassionate responding. I argue, however, that the thought of similarity is not absolutely necessary as a conceptual condition: we can in principle feel compassion for others without seeing their predicament as like one that we could experience. Our compassion for the sufferings of animals is a fine example: we are indeed similar to animals in many ways, but we don’t need that thought in order to see that what they suffer is bad, and in order to have compassion for them. For the purposes of the present argument, however, we shall see that the thought of similar possibilities has considerable importance in preventing or undoing anthropodenial; its absence is thus a sign of grave danger.

Finally, there is a further thought that is not mentioned in the tradition, which, according to me, must be mentioned: it is what I call the eudaimonistic judgment. This is a judgment or thought that places the suffering person or persons among the important parts of the life of the person who feels the emotion. It says, “They count for me: they are among my most important goals and projects.” In my more general analysis of emotions, I argue that the major human emotions are always eudaimonistic, meaning focused on the agent’s most important goals and projects, and seeing the world from the point of view of those goals, rather than from some impersonal vantage point. Thus we feel fear about damages that we see as significant for our own well-being and our other goals; we feel grief at the loss of someone who is already invested with a certain importance in our scheme of things.

Eudaimonism is not egoism. I am not claiming that emotions always view events and people as mere means to the agent’s own satisfaction or happiness; indeed I strenuously deny this. But the things that occasion a strong emotion in us are things that correspond to what we have invested with importance in
our thoughts, implicit or explicit, about what is important in life. The thought of importance need not always antecede the compassionate response: the very vivid presentation of another person’s plight may jump-start it, moving that person, temporarily, into the center of the things that matter. Thus, when people hear of an earthquake or some other comparable disaster, they often become very focused on the sufferings of the strangers involved, and these strangers really matter to them – for a time. As Adam Smith already observed, however, using the example of an earthquake in China, this focus is unstable, easily deflected back to oneself and one’s immediate surroundings, unless more stable structures of concern are built upon it that ensure a continued concern with the people of that distant nation.

What of empathy? I define empathy as the ability to imagine the situation of the other. Empathy is not mere emotional contagion, for it requires entering into the predicament of another, and this, in turn, requires some type of distinction between self and other. Empathy is not sufficient for compassion, for a sadist may have considerable empathy with the situation of another person, and use it to harm that person. An actor may have consummate empathy with his or her character without any true compassion. (Indeed, an actor might play empathetically the part of a person to whom he or she deliberately refuses compassion, believing, for example, that the person brought all his suffering on himself, or that the person was upset about a predicament that is not really worth being upset about.)

Compassion is sometimes an outgrowth of empathy. But it seems plain that we can have compassion for the suffering of creatures whose experience we cannot imagine well, or perhaps, even, at all. Of course we need some way of making sense to ourselves of the idea that they are suffering, that their predicament is really bad. But I believe that we can be convinced that animals of various sorts are suffering in the factory food industry, for example, without making much of an attempt to imagine what it is like to be a chicken or a pig. So I would say that empathy is not necessary for compassion. Often, however, it is extremely helpful. Given the imperfection of the human ability to assess predicaments, we should try as hard as we can to imagine the predicaments of others, and then see what we think about what we’ve imagined. I have also suggested that empathy involves something morally valuable in and of itself: namely, a recognition of the other as a center of experience. The empathetic torturer is very bad, but perhaps there is something worse still in the utter failure to recognize humanity.
Now we are in a position to think about the continuities and discontinuities between human and animal compassion. The first thing to be said is that no non-human animal, so far as we know, has a robust conception of fault and non-fault; thus, the compassion of animals will potentially include many suffering people and animals to whom humans refuse compassion on grounds of fault. Animals notice suffering, and they notice it very keenly; they do not, however, form the idea, “This person is not a worthy object of compassion, because she brought her suffering upon herself.” This difference is at work in my Effi Briest example: Effi’s parents are blocked in their compassion for her suffering and her early death by the obsessive thought of her transgression against social norms. Although they are strongly inclined to have compassion when they see their child waste away, they nonetheless cannot in the end experience that emotion, because of the power of the thought that their daughter has done one of the worst things imaginable. Effi’s father wonders whether Rollo is not to that extent wiser than they are, because his displacement of feeling toward Effi is not blocked.

We see here a defect of my account in Upheavals, which I have already acknowledged in responding to John Deigh’s excellent critique of the book: I do not mention that there is a type of human compassion that is in that sense very similar to Rollo’s, focusing on suffering without asking the question of fault. Young children typically have that sort of compassion, as Rousseau observes in Emile, saying of the boy’s emotion: “Whether it is their fault is not now the question. Does he even know what fault is? Never violate the order of his knowledge…”30 (Later on, Emile does learn about fault, and this is an important ingredient of his social maturity, since compassion must be regulated by the sense of justice.31) Even after the notion of fault takes root, humans remain capable of the simpler type of compassion. The idea of fault, however, will often block this simpler type, as it does in the case of Effi’s parents.

Further research in this area may show that some animals have a rudimentary idea of fault. To the extent that they have an idea of rule-following, and of deviation from rule-following, as does seem likely for some species, they may well be able to form the idea that some creatures bring their predicaments upon themselves by violating rules.32 To the extent that they lack the idea that one can choose to pursue some purposes rather than others, however, they would not be likely to go very far in the direction of distinguishing appropriate from
inappropriate choices. To the extent that they lack that conception, the idea of bringing misery on oneself would remain in a rudimentary form.

The comparison between humans and animals, then, must focus on the idea of seriousness, the idea of similar possibilities, and what I have called the eudaimonistic judgment. To move further, let us consider three examples of animal compassion or proto-compassion.

Case A: In June 2006, a research team at McGill University gave a painful injection to some mice, which induced squealing and writhing. (It was a weak solution of acetic acid, so it had no long-term harmful effects.) Also in the cage at the time were other mice who were not injected. The experiment had many variants and complexities, but to cut to the chase, if the non-pained mice were paired with mice with whom they had previously lived, they showed signs of being upset. If the non-pained mice had not previously lived with the pained mice, they did not show the same signs of emotional distress. On this basis, the experimenters conclude that the lives of mice involve social complexity: familiarity with particular other mice prepares the way for a type of emotional contagion that is at least the precursor to empathy.

Case B. In Amboseli National Park in Africa, a young female elephant was shot by a poacher. Here is a description by Cynthia Moss of the reaction of other elephants in her group, a reaction typical in all three species of elephants:

Teresia and Trista became frantic and knelt down and tried to lift her up. They worked their tusks under her back and under her head. At one point they succeeded in lifting her into a sitting position but her body flopped back down. Her family tried everything to rouse her, kicking and tusking her, and Tallulah even went off and collected a trunkful of grass and tried to stuff it into her mouth.

The elephants then sprinkled earth over the corpse, eventually covering it completely before moving off.

Case C. George Pitcher and Ed Cone were watching TV one night in their Princeton home: a documentary about a little boy in England with a congenital heart ailment. After various medical reversals, the boy died. Pitcher, sitting on the floor, found his eyes filled with tears. Instantly their two dogs, Lupa and Remus, rushed to him, almost pushing him over, and licked his eyes and cheeks with plaintive whimpers.

In the first case, we see something that we might call emotional contagion, that is, distress at the sight of another’s distress, but we have no reason to ascribe
to the mice any complex empathetic exercise of imagination, and no reason to
ascribe any sophisticated thoughts, such as the thought of seriousness or the
thought of similar possibilities. I would therefore not be inclined to call the
response a genuine emotion. The experiment is certainly interesting, showing
a natural response to the sight of the pain of another that is certainly among the
precursors of compassion. (Rousseau made much of this natural response,
oberving that the sight of pain is more powerful in this respect than the sight
of happiness: thus our weakness becomes a source of our connection to others.)
The most interesting feature, obviously, is the fact that the mice are moved by
the plight of mice they know, and not mice they don’t know. This suggests a
surprising degree of cognitive complexity, and something like an ancestor of my
eudaimonistic judgment. The mice are not precisely thinking, “These are my
familiar pals, and their fate matters to me, whereas the fate of strangers doesn’t
matter” – but they have responses that are at least the basis for forming that very
standard human thought. (Moreover, in humans the thought often influences
action without being fully formulated, so humans are in that sense not always
so far from these mice.) They have a personal point of view on the world that
differentiates between some mice and other mice.

The second and third cases are rather similar, though with significant variations.
In both, we see a recognition of the seriousness of the other creature’s plight.
The elephants are obviously aware that something major has happened to their
friend: they recognize that her collapsed posture is the sign of some serious
problem, and their increasingly frantic attempts to lift her up show their gradual
awareness that the problem will not be rectified. Pitcher’s dogs know him well;
like the elephants, they see that something unusual is going on, something that
looks serious. Notice that the thought of seriousness tracks the actual suffering
manifested by the other party: there is not the same possibility as in the human
case of forming the thought, “This person is moaning and groaning, but the
plight is not really serious.” Thus, if Pitcher were a rich person for whom the
thought of paying a just amount of tax brought tears of suffering to his eyes,
Lupa and Remus would behave in just the same way. On the other side, if
Pitcher were in a seriously bad way without being aware of it, and thus without
manifesting suffering, the dogs would not have compassion for him.

Notice that, as in the case of Rollo and the Briests, there is a subtle difference
between Pitcher’s compassion for the little boy in the documentary and the
compassion of the dogs for Pitcher: for the former is mediated by the thought of
non-fault in a way that the latter is not. Pitcher draws attention to the fact that
he was raised by a Christian Scientist mother who thought that children (and others) were always to blame for their illnesses, a very severe upbringing. Having rejected these ideas as an adult, Pitcher is able to see the little boy as a victim of circumstances. I think that his intense reaction to the documentary may have been connected to the thought of himself as a boy, cut off from compassion because of the blame that illness always brought with it: in part, he is having compassion for his own childhood self and the lack of care he experienced. The thesis of Pitcher’s book is the Fontane-like thesis that dogs are capable of an unconditional type of love that humans have difficulty achieving: in that sense the often errant judgment of fault, with its ability to disrupt compassion, is very important to his whole analysis.

Pitcher, then, strongly suggests that the judgment of fault is always a defect, and that animals are better off morally because they lack it. We should probably not follow him all the way. Dogs’ inability to form the judgment of fault at times leads them to remain loyal despite cruel behavior. Women have frequently experienced a similar problem, and their failure to judge their abusers to be at fault can be a very serious failing. While not following Pitcher all the way to a fault-free doctrine of unconditional love, however, we can certainly observe that humans often find fault erroneously, hastily, and on the basis of bad social norms – as indeed Pitcher’s mother did, blaming his illnesses on his own guilt. To that extent, looking to animals for guidance would seem to be a wise thing to do.

Turning now to the eudaimonistic judgment, we see that, as with seriousness, there is some reasonable analogue in our second and third animal cases. The elephants think that the well-being of their fellow female matters, and their behavior betrays their sense of that importance. The dogs, as is usual, ascribe immense importance to their narrow circle of humans, and react to Pitcher’s distress in a way that they would never react to the distress of a stranger.

Given that it has recently been shown that elephants can form a conception of the self, passing the mirror test, we should probably conclude that the elephants’ ability to form something like the eudaimonistic judgment is more sophisticated than that of the two dogs: having the ability to distinguish self from other, they are able to form a conception of the self as having a distinctive set of goals and ends, to a greater degree, at any rate, than is possible for animals who do not form a conception of the self.

There is something like the eudaimonistic judgment in our two animals cases, then, but there is no reason to suppose that this thought possesses much flexibility.
Elephants care about other elephants, and, above all, members of their group. (When they come upon the bones of other elephants, they attend to those bones with great concern, but they do not do this for bones of any other species.) Occasionally this concern is extended, through long experience, to a human who becomes something like a member of the group. Thus when researcher Joyce Poole returned to Kenya after a long absence, bringing her baby daughter, the elephants who knew her greeted her with the ceremony of trumpeting and defecating that typically greets the birth of a new elephant baby.37 Dogs are much more standardly symbiotic: indeed, far from showing particular concern for dogs as such, they are far more likely to include in the circle of concern whatever creatures they know and live with, including humans, dogs, and, occasionally, even cats or horses. In neither case, however, is the circle of concern very responsive to argument or education. We cannot expect elephants to learn to care for the survival of other African species; we certainly cannot expect predatory animals to learn compassion for the species they kill; and we cannot expect dogs to attach themselves to a person or dog without prolonged experience. In the human case we hope, at least, that there is a good deal more flexibility than this: people can learn to care about the sufferings they inflict on animals by killing them for food; they can learn to care about the sufferings of people they have never met.

What about similar possibilities? Humans learn, fairly early, that there are some forms of vulnerability that human life contains for all: bodily frailty and disease, pain, wounds, death. Indeed, Rousseau believed that the inevitability of this learning was morality’s great advantage in the war against hierarchy and domination: whenever a privileged group tries to think of itself as above the common human lot, this fragile self-deceptive stratagem is quickly exposed by life itself. Life is constantly teaching the lesson of human equality, in the form of exposure to a wide range of common human predicaments:

Human beings are not naturally kings, or lords, or courtiers, or rich people. All are born naked and poor; all are subject to the miseries of life; to sorrows, ills, needs, and pains of every kind. Finally, all are condemned to death. This is what truly belongs to the human being. This is what no mortal is exempt from.38

So: to what extent do animals in our second and third cases form such ideas, and in what form? It seems likely that elephants do have some conception of death and of various related bad things, as standard events in elephant life. Their standard and almost ritualized responses to death indicate that they have
at least a rudimentary conception of a species form of life and of the events that can disrupt it (or, as in the case of the birth of a child, enrich it). The fact that elephants can form a conception of the self is helpful in forming a conception of the elephant kind: for one can hardly recognize oneself as a member of a kind without recognizing oneself as a unit distinct from others. It seems less clear whether dogs have such ideas, though they certainly can remember experiences of hunger and pain, and, to that extent, conceive of such bad events as future possibilities for themselves.

IV

Animal compassion is limited, focused on the near-at-hand and relatively rigid. It is, nonetheless, rather predictable, and the natural connection to the pain of another species member remains relatively constant as a source of emotion in more sophisticated animals, despite variations in circumstance. Human compassion, as my opening cases suggest, is profoundly uneven and unreliable, in ways that make animals look, at times, like morally superior beings. Humans can markedly fail to have compassion for the very acute suffering of other humans, even their own children. They can also take a terrible delight in the infliction or the sight of suffering. Events that are paradigmatic occasions for compassionate response can elicit, instead, sadistic glee.

We can already see one way in which human compassion goes astray: through the judgment of fault. Having the generally valuable capacity to see ourselves as beings who can make choices, pursuing some inclinations and inhibiting others, we also develop the capacity to impute defective choice to others, and we inhibit compassion on that account. This capacity to think about fault and choice is generally valuable, a necessary part of moral life. And yet it can go badly astray. Sometimes it goes wrong because people want to insulate themselves from demands made by others. Thus, it is very convenient to blame the poor for their poverty and to refuse compassion on that account. If we think this way, we don’t have to do anything about the situation of the poor. Sometimes, defective social traditions play the deforming role: the idea that a woman who has sex outside marriage is for all time irredeemably stained, unworthy of friendship or love, was a prominent cultural attitude in nineteenth-century Germany, and it is this attitude that blocks the Briests from responding to their daughter’s misery. Judgments of fault clearly suffer from a variety of distortions, which cannot be traced to a single source.

For the remainder of this paper, however, I want to focus on just one central cause of distortion, which affects several of the thoughts intrinsic to compassion.
This is what I have called “anthropodenial,” the tendency of humans to define themselves as above the animal world and its bodily vulnerabilities. No other animal has this problem: no animal hates being an animal, wishes not to be an animal, tries to convince itself that it is not an animal. Anthropodenial has many aspects; let me, however, focus on its role in the generation of two emotions that are particularly likely to interfere with the formation of appropriate compassion: disgust and primitive shame. (Here I can only briefly state the conclusions of my earlier work on these two emotions, in both Upheavals of Thought and Hiding From Humanity.40)

Human infants are extremely needy, physically helpless for far longer than the young of any other animal species. They are also extremely intelligent, able, for example, to recognize the difference between one human individual and another at a far earlier age than had previously been understood – around the age of two weeks, when infants are able to differentiate the smell of their own mother’s milk on a breast pad from the smell of another woman’s milk. The ability to distinguish reliably between the whole self and another whole self takes a bit longer, but it arrives early too, and between six months and a year a child become aware that it is not part of a symbiotic world of nourishment, but a distinct member of a world whose other members sometimes care for its needs and sometimes do not.

The child’s world is painful. It sees what it needs, and it cannot move to get it. It is hungry and thirsty, but sometimes it gets fed right away and at other times not. Always, it suffers – from hunger, excretory distress, sleep disturbances, and all the familiar miseries of infant life, most of them not worrying to the parent, but profoundly agonizing to the infant. Sometimes, as in the womb, everything is perfect and the child is in a state of bliss, hooked up securely to sources of nourishment and pleasure; at other times, it is on its own and helpless. Unable as yet to form a secure conception of the likely return of comfort and security, it experiences (an inchoate form of) desolation and helplessness. Out of the infant’s predicament, formed by the sui generis combination of helplessness with high cognitive ability, grow numerous emotions: fear that the needed things will never arrive; anger that they are being withheld; joy that they are being withheld; joy and even an incipient form of gratitude when needs are met; and, finally, shame.

Shame, in general, is a painful emotion directed at a perceived shortcoming or inadequacy in the self. What I call “primitive shame” is a shame that takes as its object the shortcoming of not being omnipotent. In a sense, a baby expects to be omnipotent, because its prenatal experience, and many of its postnatal
experiences, are experiences of a blissful completeness. It cannot yet comprehend the fact that the world has not been made for its needs, nor the fact that other human beings have their own entitlements and cannot minister constantly to the baby’s needs. Its state, then, is one of what’s often called infantile narcissism, so well captured in Freud’s phrase “His Majesty the Baby.” The flip side of infantile narcissism is primitive shame. “I’m the monarch, and yet, here I am, wet, cold, and hungry.”

Shame, given narcissistic self-focusing, is connected to aggression: “I can’t stand being this helpless, but it’s your fault, since you are not waiting on me hand and foot.” (Rousseau puts this very well in Émile, describing the way in which natural human weakness leads to a desire to turn others into one’s slaves.) As time goes on, the infant’s narcissism may to some extent be mitigated by the development of a capacity for genuine concern for others, and compassion based upon that concern. Learning to get along on one’s own also helps: if one can to some extent supply one’s own needs, the need for slaves becomes less urgent – the root of the entire program of education in Émile. Nonetheless, no human being likes being helpless, and as the inevitability of death dawns on one more and more, we all realize that we are truly helpless in the most important respect of all.

As people struggle to wrest the world to their purposes and to deny the shameful fact of helplessness, it often proves useful to target a group of humans as the ones who are the shameful ones, the weak ones: we are strong, and not helpless at all, because we are able to dominate them. Thus most societies create subordinate groups of stigmatized individuals, whom ideology depicts as brutish, weak, and incapable of transcendence: we fittingly dominate them, because they are shamefully bestial, and we, of course, have managed to rise above our animality.

Disgust aids this strategy. Around the age of two or three, the infant begins to experience a very strong negative emotion directed at its own bodily waste products. Disgust has been the subject of some extremely good experimental work by Paul Rozin and others, and through a wide range of experiments they conclude that the primary objects of disgust are seen as contaminating to the self because they are reminders of our own animality: our own bodily waste products, corpses, and animals who have properties that are linked with our own waste products, animality and mortality (ooziness, bad smell, etc.). I do not accept every detail of Rozin’s argument, but in its basic lines it is very successful in explaining the occasions for disgust and its ideational content.
What is particularly interesting for our purposes is that people typically don’t stop there. It’s not enough to turn away from our own animality in revulsion: people seem to need a group of humans to bound themselves off against, who will come to symbolize the disgusting, the merely animal, thus bounding the dominant group off more securely from its own hated and feared traits. The underlying thought appears to be, “If I can successfully distinguish myself from those animalistic humans, I am that much further away from being merely animal myself.” In most societies, women function as such disgust-groups; racial and ethnic minorities may also be stigmatized as dirty, smelly, slimy, animal-like. (African-Americans and Jews have both been repeatedly stigmatized in this way.)

From this point onward, disgust and primitive shame work in close cooperation. Stigmatized as disgusting, subordinate groups are also branded as shameful: defective, unworthy, sullied, not able to rise to the heights of which transcendent humanity is capable. To the extent that the parties who are strenuously engaged in anthropodenial feel threatened, to that extent their stigmatization of the surrogates for their own animality becomes more aggressive.

Now we are ready to understand how human compassion is infected by anthropodenial. Once one has targeted a person or group as emblematic of animal decay and animal weakness, this very segmentation of the moral universe will block the formation of an idea of similar possibilities and vulnerabilities. Instead of thinking, in Rousseauesque fashion, “The lot of these unhappy people could at any moment be my own,” one will think, instead, “I am above all that. I could never suffer that.” The disgusting bodily weakness of others, the shameful condition of mere animal humanity, is seen as foreign: as the way women’s bodies so often are, or the way African-American bodies often have been. One may even become quite incapable of empathetic participation in the plight of these people: for one may see them as so brutish that they could not possibly have insides like one’s own, and they are thus to be seen only as objects, the way humans frequently view animals.

This same deformed conception of the species infects the judgment of seriousness. If certain people are mere brutes, they cannot possibly suffer very much: they are just objects, automata, and the appearance of suffering does not reliably indicate a rich inner world, containing suffering similar to one’s own.

Finally, shame and disgust infect the eudaimonistic judgment, the judgment of who belongs in one’s circle of concern. Compassion is usually underinclusive, favoring the known over the not-known. That in itself poses a great challenge
to moral education. In the cases that interest me, however, compassion also segments the known, judging some very familiar human individuals not truly worthy of concern.

Putting my claim this way, however, does not bring out the full riotousness of anthropodenial, its hysterical aggressiveness, driven by profound fear. As Rousseau noted, the denial of similar possibilities is a lie, a lie concerning important and obvious matters. And of course the disgust- and-shame-driven denial is a version of that lie. You have a body that smells and excretes. I have no such body. You will die. I will not die. You are weak. I am omnipotent. The falsity of these declarations periodically makes itself evident to the declarer — every time he excretes, has sex, gets ill. Then, the denial has to be made in a louder and more aggressive tone of voice, so that it drowns out the voice of truth. Thus a vicious ratcheting process begins, with the voice of anthropodenial more and more aggressive — until it demands the utter extinction of the being whose evident kinship to oneself inconveniently exposes the deception.

This vicious process is abetted by, and, to an extent, embodied in, stereotypes of masculinity that define the “real man” as one who is sufficient unto himself, in need of nobody, able to rise above the weakness of the mere animal body. In surprisingly many cultures, males, particularly males who have long endured humiliation of some type, tell themselves that a real man must be able to throw off all weakness, like a very efficient machine, displaying his total lack of connection to female receptivity and weakness. One remarkable and extreme form of this view was the widely influential statement of late nineteenth-century German sex-theorist Otto Weininger that women are the body of the man, and that men must repudiate all in themselves that is bodily, ergo female.42

Anthropodenial is thus linked with an aggressive and potentially violent misogyny, and it is in relations with women, far more than relations with subordinate ethnic or racial groups, that the anxiety about the unmasking of the lie becomes most prominent. Woman, because of her obvious connection with birth and sexual intercourse, comes to emblemize animal nature. The person who is desperate to deny animal nature must not only deny that he is a woman, he must also deny all commonality between him and the woman, imagining himself as sharing none of the inconvenient traits that make woman an object of disgust and shame. But he cannot avoid contact with women, as he may be able to avoid contact with Jews, or blacks, or Muslims. Indeed, he finds himself strongly desiring such contact, and repeatedly engaging in very intimate forms of bodily exchange, involving sweat and semen and other signs of his own true
nature. So disgust (as so often) follows this descent into the animal, and the only way out of the disgust is to blame it on the woman, to accuse her of luring the otherwise transcendent being into the animal realm. As he repeatedly enters that realm, the denial of his membership must be made in a louder voice, and his conception of himself must be made more metallic, more invulnerable, until the demand for the total extinction of the female, both in the self and in the world, is the logical outcome. The female must be extinguished in the world because she is in the self. She can only cease to be in the self if she ceases to be in the world. And of course compassion, the affirmation of commonality and personal significance, will have been blocked long since.

Let us now return to my three cases, seeing how it happens that humans fall so far below the kindly dogs and elephants, and even below ferocious tigers and lions, who might kill a woman for prey, out of instinct, but not for self-insulation, out of fantasy and denial of their own nature. The case of Tolstoy’s murdering husband is a classic case for my thesis. He clearly feels disgust for the female body, and for the sexual act that draws him toward that body. At the same time, he cannot stop feeling himself drawn there, and the very strength of his desire threatens, again and again, to expose his project of rising above the animal. Sexuality and its vulnerabilities are difficult enough for any human being to deal with at any time. All cultures probably contain seeds of violence in connection with sexuality. But a person who has been taught to have a big stake in being above the sexual domain, above the merely animal, cannot bear to be dragged into that domain. And yet, of course, the very denial and repression of the sexual build within a mounting tension. (Tolstoy’s diaries describe how the tension mounts and mounts inside him until he has to use his wife, and then he despises her, despises himself, and wants to use force against her to stop the cycle from continuing.) In the end, the husband sees, there is nothing to be done but to kill the woman. And the husband also suggests that there is no way for women to prevent themselves from being killed by men, unless they stop being animal, sexual bodies, forgoing intercourse. Join the project of anthropodenial, conceal your bodily nature, and you might possibly be saved. While his wife lives, he cannot have compassion for her, because he cannot see her as human: she is an animal, a brute, utterly dissimilar and terrifyingly similar. She is forcibly ejected from his circle of concern by the sheer terror that her presence arouses. Dead, she suddenly looks more like a non-animal: she no longer has the animal magnetism that repels him, she seems like she might even have been a rational being.
Effi’s parents fail to have compassion for her, despite her evident suffering - so moving to Fontane’s reader, as to Rollo — because of a deformation in their judgment of fault, we said. But where does that deformation come from? As we soon see, studying the novel further, Effi’s is a culture (like so many) that divides women into two types: pure angels, who are not animals, and disgusting whores, who are mere animals. There can be no compassion for the latter, because their base nature brought calamity upon them, and it is just the normal outcome of having a base nature, not really a calamity at all. Thus the judgment of fault is interwoven with a defective judgment of similarity: much though we thought of her as our child, she must all along have had a disgusting nature, more like the nature of an animal. (That is why Frau von Briest’s suggestion that Effi’s misdeed resulted not from evil, but, rather, from being married too young, is so threatening to both of them: go down this track, and the whole balance of their human relations would have to be called into question.) They eject her from their circle of concern through their reasoning about dissimilarity and nature-based fault, and they will not permit truth and reason to threaten the self-protective structure they have built up. Rollo, for his part, thinks nothing of fault and sees only the immensity of Effi’s suffering; nor does he segment the world into the pure and the impure. It never occurred to him that there was anything wrong with having a bodily nature.

While depicting the parents’ warped judgments of fault, Fontane cultivates in his reader, from the novel’s start, a Rollo-like disposition, unjudgmental, focused on actual suffering, and skeptical of social norms about women. Indeed, the reader has for some time understood very well what the von Briests dimly intuit at the end: that Effi, high-spirited and far from evil, was simply too young to get married. Guided by the non-moral Rollo-like compassion that the reader has formed toward Effi from the very start of the novel, the reader forms judgments of fault, at the end (blaming the parents, the husband, and the surrounding society) that are far more accurate than those formed by Effi’s parents.

Now to Gujarat. Lurking beneath any culturally specific scenario, lies the general human longing we have described: to escape from a reality that is found to be too dirty, too mortal, too decaying. For a group powerful enough to subordinate another group, escape may possibly be found (in fantasy) through stigmatization of, and aggression against, the group that exemplifies the properties the dominant group finds shameful and revolting in itself. When this dynamic is enacted toward women, who are at the same time alluring, the combination of desire and revulsion/shame may cause a particularly unstable relationship to
develop, with violence always waiting in the wings. Women of a minority group that has already been stigmatized as shameful become targets of reactive shame in a double, and doubly intense, way. The body of the woman, always a convenient vehicle for such displacement, becomes all the more alluring as a target when it is the body of the discredited and feared “other,” in this case the hyperfertile and hyperbodily Muslim woman.

In the cultural and historical circumstances of (many) Gujarati Hindu males - to some extent real, to some extent fantasized - conditions are created to heighten anxiety and remove barriers to its expression. Ideology tells such men that they have for centuries been subordinated, first by Muslims and then by the British, and subordinated on account of a Hindu sexuality that is too playful, too sensuous, too unaggressive. To be as powerful as the Victorian conqueror, the Hindu male must show himself to be both pure and consummately warlike.

At the same time, conditions that would have militated against these tendencies - a public critical culture, a robust development of the sympathetic imagination - were particularly absent in Gujarati schools and civil society. (Here my analysis converges very strongly with Glover’s, in identifying a set of factors that might have blocked the turn to violence.) This specific cultural scenario explains why we might expect the members of the Hindu right, and the men to whom they make their political appeal, to exhibit an unusual degree of disgust anxiety, as manifested in a paranoid insistence on the Hindu male’s purity and freedom from lust – and, at the same time, his consummate aggressiveness.

The hate literature circulated before the pogrom portrays the Muslim woman as hypersexual, enjoying the penises of many men. That is not by itself unusual; Muslim women have often been portrayed in that denigrating way, as closer to the animal than other women. But it then introduces a new element: the desire that is imputed to these women is to be penetrated by an uncircumcised penis. Thus the Hindu male creates a pornographic fantasy with himself as its subject. In one way, these images show anxiety about virility, assuaging it by imagining the successful conquest of Muslim women. But of course, like Tolstoy’s husband’s fantasies, these are not fantasies of intercourse only. The idea of this intercourse is inseparable from ideas of mutilation and violence. Fucking a Muslim woman just means killing her. The fantasy image of the untying of the penises that were “tied until now” is very reminiscent of the explosions of violence in Tolstoy, only the logic has been carried one small step further: instead of murder following sex, because of sex, the murder just is the sex. Women are killed precisely by having large metal objects inserted into their vaginas.
In this way, the image is constructed of a sexuality that is so effective, so closely allied with the desire for domination and purity, that its penis just is a pure metal weapon, not a sticky thing of flesh and blood. The Hindu male does not even need to dirty his penis with the contaminating fluids of the Muslim woman. He can fuck her with the clean non-porous metal weapon that kills her, remaining pure himself, and securely above the animal. Sexuality itself carries out the project of annihilating the sexual. Nothing is left to inspire fear.

A useful comparison is the depiction of warlike masculinity in a novel of Ernst Jünger, *Kampf als inneres Erlebnis, Battle as Inner Experience*:

These are the figures of steel whose eagle eyes dart between whirling propellers to pierce the cloud; who dare the hellish crossing through fields of roaring craters, gripped in the chaos of tank engines...men relentlessly saturated with the spirit of battle, men whose urgent wanting discharges itself in a single concentrated and determined release of energy.

As I watch them noiselessly slicing alleyways into barbed wire, digging steps to storm outward, synchronizing luminous watches, finding the North by the stars, the recognition flashes: this is the new man. The pioneers of storm, the elect of central Europe. A whole new race, intelligent, strong, men of will...supple predators straining with energy. They will be architects building on the ruined foundations of the world.

In this fascinating passage, Jünger combines images of machinery with images of male aggressiveness to express the thought that the new man must be in some sense both predatory and invulnerable. The one thing he must never be is human. His masculinity is characterized not by animal need and receptivity, but by a “concentrated and determined release of energy.” He knows no fear, no sadness. Why must the new man have these properties? Because the world’s foundations have been ruined. Jünger suggests that the only choices, for males living amid death and destruction, are either to yield to an immense and ineluctable sadness or to throw off the humanity that inconveniently inflicts pain.

Something like this paranoia, this refusal of compromised humanity, infects the rhetoric of the Hindu right, and, indeed, may help explain its original founders’ fascination with German fascism, as well as manifesting the influence, over time, of that same ideology. The woman functions as a symbol of the site of animal weakness and vulnerability inside any male, who can be drawn into his own mortality through desire. The Muslim woman functions double as such a symbol. In this way, a fantasy is created that her annihilation will lead
to safety and invulnerability – perhaps, to “India Shining,” the Jünger-like Hindu-right campaign slogan that betrays a desire for a crystalline sort of domination.\textsuperscript{49}

Only this complex logic explains, I believe, why torture and mutilation are preferred as alternatives to abduction and impregnation – or even simple homicide. Only this logic explains why the fantasy of penetrating the sexual body with a large metal object played such a prominent role in the carnage. Only this explains, as well, the repetitious destruction of the woman’s body by fire, as though the world cannot be clean until all vestiges of the female body are obliterated from its face.

Human beings are animals, and we inhabit the animal world. We should learn all we can from continuities between the emotions of humans and those of other animals. The diseases of human life, however, are, for the most part, diseases that are utterly foreign to the world of elephants and bonoboes, even the more aggressive chimpanzees, because these diseases – many of them, at any rate – spring from a hatred of embodiment and death, of the condition of being an animal – and the human is the only animal that hates its own animality. Jonathan Glover’s wonderful inquiry into human depravity refers, in its title, to a problem: “humanity” means the condition of being human, which we are stuck with, but it is also used by Glover to mean sympathy, respect, and kindliness, qualities opposed to “inhumanity,” which, as he shows, we humans all too often exhibit. I have argued that “humanity,” the condition of being (merely, animally) human, and our painful awareness of that non-transcendent condition, are major sources of “inhumanity,” the ability to withhold compassion and respect from other human beings. My argument suggests that a deeper inquiry into the unique problems humans have in dealing with their mortality, decay, and general animal vulnerability will help us understand inhumanity more fully. Without this further inquiry, indeed, we have little hope of coming up with an adequate account of gendered violence, or of the aspects of violence in general that are implicitly gendered, involving a repudiation of the filth, stickiness, and non-hardness that are the lot of all human beings, but that are all too often imputed to the female body alone.\textsuperscript{50

\textbf{Postscript.} When I think of Jonathan Glover, I immediately think of his compassion. We worked together at the World Institute for Development Economics Research in Helsinki, initially during a time of personal stress for me, and I will always be grateful for the precision of his attention and the pleasure of his company, as well as, of course, the wonderful quality of his philosophical contributions. Later, I lived during two summers in Oxford (while he went back to London for the vacation) in the little college house he
used during the term, and I first was drawn to this topic by reading the wonderful books on violence and inhumanity that he had stored there. But I think the stimulus of his own humane and gentle personality was more important by far than the books in generating these thoughts, and I dedicate this paper to him with deep friendship.

NOTES
1. Not, of course, that they count as failures in thinking about non-human animals.
3. Thus “anthropodenial” is a trait that only humans can have: it is the tendency to deny our humanity, or to hide from it. It is conceptually possible for a different sort of animal to have a related flaw, denying that it is the species of animal that it is. In fact, however, this sort of denial appears to be present only in our species.
4. Published in 1894; my own translation from the German.
5. Published 1889; for its close relationship to Tolstoy’s diaries concerning his sexual relationship with his wife, see Andrea Dworkin, “Repulsion,” in Intercourse (New York: The Free Press 1987), 3-20.
7. Primates and Philosophers.
9. Korsgaard, p. 104. See also p. 118: “The distinctiveness of human action is as much a source of our capacity for evil as of our capacity for good.”
11. This part of my argument will be closely related to chapters 5 and 15 (on Whitman) of Upheavals, and especially to Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
13. He actually uses, throughout, the term “sympathy,” but very much in the way that I use the term “compassion,” so I hope I shall be forgiven to sticking to the usage I have already established; on the terms, see Upheavals, 301-304. As I note there, Adam Smith uses “compassion” for fellow-feeling with another’s pain, “sympathy” for the broader tendency to have fellow feeling with “any passion whatever.” This difference is immaterial in the present context, since we are speaking of pain only.


15. Ibid.

16. On 343, he writes: “Like many Freudian interpretations, Theweleit’s account is suggestive but hard to test.” Elsewhere, however, Glover does draw attention to a related matter, the tendency of people to compare subordinate groups to animals: see, for example, p. 339.

17. Upheavals, ch. 6, 304-335.

18. Again, see Upheavals, 301-4; I avoid the term “pity” because, although used synonymously with “compassion” in translating Greek tragedies and Rousseau’s French term pitié, in modern English it has acquired connotations of condescension and superiority that it did not have earlier, and I am focusing on an emotion that does not necessarily involve superiority.

19. See Upheavals, ch. 6.


21. See my discussion of her findings in Upheavals, 313-14.

22. See Upheavals, 315-21.

23. See Upheavals, 31-33.


Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariouslyness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment....And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue
his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the more profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own.

25. See Upheavals, 327-34.

26. For a similar view, see de Waal, Primates and Philosophers, 26-7; Nussbaum, Upheavals, 327-8.

27. For a similar argument, see de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 41; Upheavals, 329.

28. Important research on this topic has been done by C. Daniel Batson, whose experiments typically involve one group who are asked to imagine vividly the plight of a person whose story is being read to them, and another group who are asked merely to assess the technical qualities of the broadcast. The first group is far more likely to report an experience of compassion, and also more likely (indeed, very likely) to do something to help the person, provided that there is a helpful thing that is ready to hand and does not exact too high a cost. See Batson, The Altruism Question (Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991).

29. See Upheavals 333: Here I discuss Heinz Kohut’s remarks about the Nazis, and I consider a variety of different types of psychopaths.


31. P. 253. Rousseau puts the introduction of the idea of fault extremely late in the child’s development: Emile is already going through puberty before he even experiences compassion (given Rousseau’s belief that he will be turned toward others in the first place only by awakening sexual energy), and the thought of fault comes along considerably later than that. I think, by contrast, that children start to ask questions about fault as early as they are able to feel guilt about their own aggression, probably around the age of five or six, and it is only before that that their compassion is consistently of the simple Rollo variety.


38. *Emile*, p. 222 (with a few revisions to the Bloom translation: “Human beings” is substituted for “Men,” “rich people” for “rich men,” “the human being” for “man.”

39. Clark (see above) finds that this attitude is extremely common in America. Of course, even if we did believe that the poor are poor on account of bad choices, it would not follow that we should have no compassion for their situation: for, as Thomas Paine already observed in *The Rights of Man*, we might conclude that bad choices were themselves an outgrowth of stunting social circumstances, such as lack of adequate education and employment opportunities.

40. I give no references to the psychological literature here, since they are given in great detail in those two books, particularly the latter.

41. Glover draws attention to the many ways in which subordination and violence rely on stigmatization and disgust: see especially 338-9, 340-2, 356.

42. Weininger, *Sex and Character*, anonymous translation from sixth German edition (London and New York: William Heinemann and G. P. Putnam’s Sons, no date given – the first German edition was published in 1903). This crazy book, by a self-hating Jew and homosexual, had a huge influence, and was considered by Ludwig Wittgenstein to be a work of genius. I discuss some of its wilder claims in *Hiding*.


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45. For the stigmatization of minorities as a device to cement a sense of national identity, see Clash chapter 6, drawing on George L. Mosse’s classic Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

46. For the role of a myth of the Muslim woman as hyperfertile – which plays a tremendously prominent role in Gujarati political rhetoric – see Clash, ch. 6. Narendra Modi’s campaign slogan, on the way to his landslide (post-riot) electoral victory in 2002, was “We are two and we have two; they are five and they have twenty-five.” In other words, Hindus are monogamous and relatively chaste, only two children per couple; Muslims are polygamous, each man having four wives, and each wife, hyperfertile, has 6.25 children! In reality, the rate of polygamy is identical for Hindus and Muslims, around 5 percent (though it is illegal for Hindus and legal for Muslims), and the growth rates of the two populations are just the same, and not very high.

47. See the cultural and historical material in Clash chapter 6, showing the way in which British contempt for the type of sexuality typical in Hindu mythology contributed to this pervasive climate of shame. A very perceptive example occurs in Rabindranath Tagore’s novel The Home and the World (1916), concerning the rise of the Hindu nationalist movement. His nationalist anti-hero finds himself unable to rape the woman he desires, and he is ashamed of that failure. He muses to himself that there are two types of music: the Hindu flute and the British military band. He wishes he could hear in his blood the music of the military band, rather than that disturbingly non-aggressive flute.

48. See discussion in Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, vol. 2, 160-2, and in Glover, p. 343 (see above).

49. Interestingly, L. K. Advani, the current leader of the BJP, the political party of the Hindu right, just announced that this slogan was a mistake: they should have said “India Rising.” (Times of India, December 17, see http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2629479.cms). Advani, though a hard-liner, is extremely perceptive, and he understands, it would seem, that the idea of purity and perfection offended rural voters, whose lives were not particularly shining. Perhaps, too, at a deeper level he understands the importance of not pretending to a manhood that is invulnerable and above others. (As I discuss in Clash, chapter 5,
Advani’s decision to make a respectful visit to the tomb of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was greeted with hoots of outraged masculinity by many members of his own group, who accused him of “sucking Jinnah’s cock,” and other things of this sort.

50. On filth as a Nazi preoccupation, see Glover 339, 356.